No-contest pleas; Motion to withdraw plea; MCR 6.310(C)(3); Preliminary exam; Waiver; MCL 767.42(1); MCL 766.4(4); Unconditional plea; People v McKinley; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Personal jurisdiction; People v Eaton; Preliminary exam as waivable right; People v Hall; Implied consent to personal jurisdiction; People v Lown; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Preliminary exam waiver without consent; Ginther hearing; People v Ginther; Plea prejudice; People v Pennington

The court held that defendant failed to identify an error in the plea proceedings that would allow him to withdraw his no-contest pleas, and he failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant pled no contest in consolidated home-invasion cases after no preliminary exams were held, and the trial court denied his later motions to withdraw his pleas and dismiss the cases. On appeal, the court first held that he did not satisfy MCR 6.310(C)(3) because he “identifie[d] no error in the plea proceeding” and made no cogent argument that the rule’s requirements were met. The court rejected his claim that the lack of preliminary exams deprived the circuit court of “procedural jurisdiction,” explaining that Michigan recognizes subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, not procedural jurisdiction. It reasoned that a preliminary exam is “not an absolute prerequisite” to subject-matter jurisdiction because MCL 767.42(1) and MCL 766.4(4) allow waiver, and under Hall, a defendant who pleads to the information without objecting to the absence of an examination or valid waiver “is deemed to have waived that right.” The court also held that defendant consented to personal jurisdiction by entering no-contest pleas and participating in the proceedings, including by repeatedly expressing his willingness to plead and “accept [his] responsibility.” Finally, the court held that his ineffective-assistance claim failed. As to one case, defendant stated on the record that he waived the preliminary exam, and as to the other, even assuming deficient performance, he could not show plea prejudice under Pennington because there was no evidence better advocacy would have produced a better offer or that he would have gone to trial. Affirmed.