A prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to medical needs; Qualified immunity; Clearly established constitutional right; Proper level of specificity; District of Columbia v Wesby; Howell v NaphCare, Inc; Burwell v City of Lansing; Distinguishing Tlamka v Serrell (8th Cir) & Estate of Carter v City of Detroit; Goode v Berlanga (Unpub 6th Cir)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that defendant-corrections officer (Falk) was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Case law did not put him “on notice—beyond debate—that failing to immediately respond to solely an oral complaint of chest pain violates the Eighth Amendment.” Eight minutes after complaining to Falk about bad chest pains, plaintiff-Richardson was taken to the medical wing for treatment, where he later had a heart attack. The district court denied Falk’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court began by defining the asserted constitutional right in question “with the proper level of specificity.” It noted that “the core element of the inquiry” is whether, “given the officer’s particular circumstances, is the constitutional violation beyond debate?” Considering Richardson’s version of the facts, the question became whether, at the time, it was “clearly established that an officer must immediately provide medical assistance to a prisoner who merely complains of symptoms but does not display any external signs of distress? The answer is no.” Richardson contended “the right should be defined as if Falk completely denied healthcare to a heart attack victim” because he eventually had one and there was no evidence “that Falk sent him to the medical wing.” But his proposed characterization defined “the right at a highly general level that fails to account for Falk’s particular circumstances[.] Additionally, this was not a complete denial of healthcare[.]” Richardson alternatively asserted, relying on Tlamka, that even defining “the right by the eight-minute delay,” Falk violated his “clearly established rights by not immediately providing aid.” But the court found that this case was “a far cry from Tlamka[.]” It concluded that brief “complaints of symptoms, with nothing more, fall short of the obvious displays of medical issues addressed in prior caselaw; the contours of the right to be free from deliberate indifference do not clearly include Falk’s alleged shortcomings.” While Richardson also relied on Carter, his “oral complaint of chest pain, without any other sign of distress, does not stack up to the cumulative signs of a serious illness that” were ignored in Carter. Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for Falk.