Auto insurance policy rescission; Whether an individual was an innocent third party; Waiver; Whether the court had jurisdiction over defendant-insurer’s claims against third-party-defendant medical providers; “Aggrieved”; MCR 7.203(A)

The court concluded that there was no evidence plaintiff (Banker Sr.) committed any fraud in procuring the auto insurance policy issued by defendant-insurer (CURE). Thus, the trial court properly determined that he was an innocent third party for purposes of CURE’s summary disposition motion. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over CURE’s claims against the third-party-defendant medical providers. The case involved a policy obtained on a 2000 Jeep that nonparty-Banker Jr. obtained from CURE. Banker Sr. was later injured in an accident while driving that vehicle. CURE argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not extending “the rescission of Banker Jr.’s policy to Banker Sr. because Banker Sr. aided in fraudulently procuring” it. CURE contended that as a result, it was improper to weigh the equities “because Banker Sr. was not an innocent third party.” But the court agreed with the trial court that the record evidence established “that Banker Jr. procured the policy on his own without Banker Sr.’s aid.” As to CURE’s argument based on Banker Sr. adding a 2016 Jeep to the policy in a phone call, it did not “explain why adding the 2016 Jeep to Banker Jr.’s policy” resulted in a new, rather than an amended, policy or establish “that Banker Sr. somehow engaged in fraud when the policy was originally procured.” As to its brief argument that the equities “would inevitably weigh in” its favor, CURE failed to “address any of the factors that went into the trial court’s ruling, even its analysis of Banker Sr.’s purported fraud.” As to the third-party defendant medical “providers, CURE was not ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of MCR 7.203(A)” by any trial court ruling related to them. Its only claims against them “were resolved in the final consent judgment, and any injury that” it suffered as a result of that judgment was due to its “decision to agree to the judgment, not by any action taken by the trial court.”