Sufficiency of the evidence for an operating while intoxicated (OWI) causing death conviction (MCL 257.625(4)); Proximate cause; People v Schaefer; Superseding cause; People v Feezel; Gross negligence; Great weight of the evidence; People v Lacalamita

Rejecting defendant’s challenge as to the proximate cause element, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support his OWI causing death conviction, and that the conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence. He contended that the victim’s (M) “intoxication and actions were grossly negligent and therefore a superseding cause that relieved defendant of criminal liability.” The court concluded that, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” as required, “a rational trier of fact could have found that [M’s] conduct was merely negligent and did not break the causal chain.” It determined that a rational trier of fact could have found that while M “was intoxicated, his intoxication did not cause him to act in a manner that was not reasonably foreseeable. A victim’s conduct of driving while intoxicated does not automatically amount to a superseding cause as a matter of law; instead, proximate causation must be decided by the jury on a case-by-case basis.” The expert testimony about the effect of M’s “intoxication on the crash was mixed.” The court concluded “that a rational jury could have found that [M’s] actions amounted to mere ordinary negligence such that defendant’s operation of his vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident.” While defendant argued that the “case ‘is eerily like’ Feezel[,]” the court noted that “Feezel does not mandate that the jury reach a particular outcome; instead, [it] concerns whether evidence should have been submitted to the jury” as to whether a victim was grossly negligent. The “trial court complied with Feezel by submitting the issue” of whether M’s intoxication was a superseding cause “to the jury, and the jury rendered its verdict.” As to his great weight argument, the evidence reasonably supported “the conclusion that [M] was simply negligent as opposed to grossly negligent, [it] does not preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand, and there” also was “no indication that the jury’s decision was motivated by passion, prejudice, or some other extraneous influence.” Affirmed.