Motion to set aside an order; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); Heugel v Heugel; “Extraordinary circumstances”; Rose v Rose

Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff’s motion to set aside a stipulated order under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), the court vacated the order granting that motion and remanded. This was a postjudgment divorce case. The 10/3/22 “stipulated order incorporated the parties’ agreement to share the cost of healthcare expenses for their adult children.” The court concluded that “the trial court did not identify any improper conduct by” defendant-ex-husband by which he obtained entry of that order. His “alleged ‘spurious accounting’ and delay in filing a motion to show cause did not constitute extraordinary circumstances because MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) is typically reserved for scenarios in which ‘the judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered.’ The alleged ‘spurious accounting’ and delay in enforcement occurred after the judgment was entered. A party’s alleged misconduct when enforcing a judgment may justify a motion for sanctions, but not relief from the judgment.” As a result, the court was unable to find that there were extraordinary circumstances mandating “setting aside the order in order to achieve justice. On the current record, this appears simply to be a situation in which recurring late fees accrued over a long period of time because of payments that were allegedly never made, which is a potential scenario that the parties should have been aware of at the time that they agreed to the late-fee provision.” It found that the circumstances here appeared “even less extraordinary than in Rose.” It concluded that the “difference between the unpaid reimbursement and the total late fees may have shocked the trial court, and it may or may not be justifiable for other reasons, but it was not an unexpected or unusual circumstance that would mandate setting aside the order.” Further, it determined that the “decision to set aside the order detrimentally affected defendant’s substantial rights to the late fees, including any late fees that the parties had already paid.”