Pretrial detention; Bail Reform Act; 18 USC § 3142(e)(1); Review of detention decision; United States v Hazime; United States v Stone; Dangerousness; § 3142(g); Cyberstalking; § 2261A(2); Interstate communications involving threats; § 875(c); Threat to individual or community; United States v Munchel (DC Cir); Conditions of release; Internet monitoring; Home detention

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the Bail Reform Act required defendant’s pretrial detention because the government proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous and no release conditions would reasonably assure public safety. A grand jury indicted defendant for cyberstalking and transmitting interstate threats after online posts and messages involving federal law-enforcement officers, supporters, and the alleged doxxing of J.S. A magistrate judge ordered him detained, but the district court released him with conditions including GPS monitoring, home detention, restricted internet access, a social-media ban, and a no-threats condition. On appeal, the court first held that de novo review applied to the ultimate detention decision under Hazime and Stone. It then held that the § 3142(g) factors supported detention. The charged offenses weighed in favor of detention because they involved alleged threats to harm J.S., and attempts to minimize the risk were unpersuasive because there is no rule allowing “cyberstalking or interstate threats so long as the victim has a controversial persona.” The weight of the dangerousness evidence also favored detention because defendant’s posts included statements the district court accepted could be read as “actual threats,” including calls to “fight” federal agents and “[g]et your . . . guns and stop” them. The court also relied on private messages in which defendant allegedly entertained a request to help “kill” J.P. by offering to pass “credible verifiable information” to his “team.” The court further held that the nature and seriousness of the danger were significant because internet-based threats and doxxing pose “well-documented harms,” and defendant’s threats toward law enforcement were strong evidence of danger. Finally, the court held that the district court’s release conditions were insufficient because they mostly “hinge on” defendant’s “good faith compliance,” internet monitoring was easy to evade, and GPS or home detention would not prevent online threats or inducing others to act. Reversed.