Dangerous animal complaint; MCL 287.322; Dangerous animal; MCL 287.321(a)(ii); Provocation; MCL 287.321(d); Objective reasonable-person standard; Statutory interpretation; In re Bradley Estate; Unpreserved civil issue; Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC; Mootness

Noting the previous lack of published authority on the definition of “provoke” in the statute, the court held that the district court applied the wrong standard when deciding whether the dog (Chance) was provoked under MCL 287.321(d). After a guest put her face within less than six inches of Chance’s face and loudly scolded him over a shoe, Chance bit off part of her nose. The district court found Chance was a “dangerous animal” and ordered euthanasia, and the circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the court held that the statutory definition of “provoke” requires a “wholly objective standard.” The proper inquiry was whether the guest’s conduct constituted “a willful act or omission that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude is likely to precipitate the bite or attack by an ordinary dog or animal.” The district court instead relied partly on the guest’s subjective familiarity with Chance and her comfort getting close to him, reasoning that she “obviously felt” familiar enough with him to do so. The court concluded this misconstrued MCL 287.321(d). It also noted the district court failed to make credibility findings on whether the guest was waving the shoe, which mattered because the testimony conflicted on that point. The court declined to review respondent’s unpreserved argument about a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and held that the challenge to the denial of relief from judgment was moot. Reversed, vacated, and remanded.