Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); “Neglect” (MCL 722.602(1)(d)); Distinguishing In re Lange; Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), (j), & (k)(ii); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re Mota; Requirement that the trial court assess the current situation

The court held that while the trial court did not clearly err in exercising jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), it did clearly err in finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. Thus, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the termination order, and remanded. A preponderance of the evidence supported the “finding that respondent, ‘by reason of neglect,’ failed to provide” the child (CP) “a fit ‘home or environment.’” Immediately after CP was born, respondent reported to CPS “‘that there wasn’t a home to go to’ and failed to seek other reasonable housing alternatives.” The court noted that it was CP’s situation that was at issue – while respondent lived in a facility, its rules did not permit children. She relied on Lange, but the court found it distinguishable. Here, respondent chose to participate in a “program knowing that it did not accommodate children, and [she] did not seek out alternative living arrangements for herself or her soon-to-be-born child.” As to statutory grounds for termination, the court held that § (g) was not established because the record did “not support a finding that there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide such care and custody within a reasonable time considering” CP’s age. By the time of the trial, she “had fully and successfully participated in multiple forms of educational and therapeutic programming, had made significant progress in striving toward stability and independence, and had support systems in place as she emerged from the” program. As to §§ (b)(i), (b)(ii), (j), and (k)(ii), the court addressed the doctrine of anticipatory neglect. It noted that “‘probative’ does not mean dispositive or conclusive, and the probative value of the evidence in question depends on the circumstances of each individual case.” While respondent’s past abuse of CP’s sibling (MP) was “disturbing, the trial court was required to assess respondent’s (and CP’s) current situation to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that CP would be harmed in respondent’s care. The record” showed that the abuse of MP took place in 2017, “when respondent was a 19-year-old victim of human trafficking and directed by her own abuser to commit the abusive acts. It also” showed that she was “now far removed from that world[.]”