Set aside of a default; MCR 2.603(D)(1); Shawl v Spence Bros, Inc; “Good cause”; Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC; Sufficiency of the default notice; MCR 2.603(A)(2); Whether a negligence claim actually sounded in breach of contract; Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC; Duty breach as to installation of an HVAC system

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default against third-party defendant-Strickly Heating and Cooling or err in granting Strickly summary disposition of defendants/third-party plaintiffs-Ellises’ negligence claim. The Ellises contracted with plaintiff to perform construction work on their home. Plaintiff subcontracted Strickly to install and restore the home’s HVAC system. On appeal, the court first concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that good cause was established for setting aside the default. The “trial court was presented with not one, but two defaulted parties who provided affidavits that they relied on” assertions by plaintiff’s owner that he would take care of the lawsuit, “did not receive notice of the default entries, and promptly took action to defend the lawsuit upon learning of the Ellises’ motion for default judgment. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances to determine that Strickly’s request to set aside the default was supported by good cause. This determination did not fall outside the range of reasonable or principled outcomes.” The court further found that it was “implicit in the trial court’s ruling that Strickly established a meritorious defense. To the extent that the trial court erred by failing to make its finding explicit, reversal is not required because its determination was supported by the record.” The court next held that the trial court did not err in determining “the Ellises’ claim sounded in contract and that Strickly owed” them no duty that would support their negligence claim. It did not owe them “an independent legal duty that was separate from its contractual obligations[.]” The court further concluded that they did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to “whether Strickly breached its duty by installing the HVAC system in an unworkmanlike manner or was unjustly enriched by receiving payment for faulty work.” Affirmed.