Motion to dismiss; Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA); “Processing” marijuana; MCL 333.27953(x); MRTMA immunity; MCL 333.27955(1)(b); Butane extraction; MCL 333.27954(1)(d); People v Korkigian; Inconsistent laws; MCL 333.27954(5); People v Hess; Involuntary manslaughter; MCL 750.321; People v Mendoza; Third-degree child abuse; MCL 750.136b(5)(b); People v Lawhorn

The court held that butane extraction is “processing” under the MRTMA, requiring dismissal of the marijuana charge, but that MRTMA immunity did not bar prosecution for involuntary manslaughter or third-degree child abuse. Defendant was charged after he used butane extraction to make marijuana concentrate in a bathroom, causing an explosion and fire that killed his fiancé and severely burned his child and himself. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, ruling under Korkigian that butane extraction was not protected processing under the MRTMA. On appeal, the court held that butane extraction falls within MCL 333.27953(x) because the statutory definition broadly includes “extract” and “otherwise mak[ing] or prepar[ing] marihuana concentrate.” It also reasoned MCL 333.27954(1)(d) “itself suggests that butane extraction is immune activity when it occurs in a protected place,” because it excludes public places, motor vehicles, and residential curtilage, but not the inside of a residence. Thus, the marijuana charge was barred by MRTMA immunity. But the court held that the manslaughter and child-abuse charges could proceed because the MRTMA does not immunize criminal negligence. The court reasoned those statutes were not “inconsistent with” the MRTMA because involuntary manslaughter may rest on a “lawful act, negligently performed,” and third-degree child abuse may rest on an act that poses an unreasonable risk to a child. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.