e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86372
Opinion Date : 08/14/2026
e-Journal Date : 08/31/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Marrison
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Gadola, Riordan, and Swartzle
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Issues:

Substitution of appointed counsel; Sixth Amendment; Good cause; People v Strickland; Prosecutorial error; Vouching; People v Dobek; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to improper commentary; People v Douglas; Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; Eighth Amendment; People v Kardasz; Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); Fourth Amendment; People v Hallak

Summary

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief on his substitute-counsel, prosecutorial-error, ineffective-assistance, SORA, or LEM claims. Defendant was convicted of CSC I and CSC II after the victim testified that he sexually assaulted her during car rides when she was a young child, and the jury also heard that he admitted touching her vagina and touching her in an “uncomfortable” manner. Before trial, defendant said he wanted to “fire” his appointed attorney, but he proceeded to trial with that attorney. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to inquire further or appoint substitute counsel because defendant “failed to adequately articulate a basis for substitution” and gave no legitimate reason suggesting a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court next held that the prosecutor did not elicit improper vouching from the victim’s aunt or uncle because they testified only about behavioral changes, not the victim’s truthfulness. Although the mother’s volunteered statement that the victim “doesn’t lie” may have been improper, any error was not prejudicial because the statement was brief, the victim’s testimony was corroborated, and defendant’s own explanation for the touching was “simply implausible.” The court also held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object or for conceding that delayed disclosure can be common. Finally, the court held that Kardasz foreclosed defendant’s facial SORA challenge and his as-applied challenge failed because he committed “the most elevated registrable offense,” while Hallak foreclosed his cruel-or-unusual and Fourth Amendment challenges to LEM. Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion