Parenting time modification; Whether the modification changed the child’s established custodial environment (ECE); Rains v Rains; “Weekend parent” claim; Distinguishing Powery v Wells & Lieberman v Orr; Child’s best-interests; Factor (j) (MCL 722.23(j)); Parental alienation; Great weight of the evidence; School selection; Pierron v Pierron; Appellate jurisdiction; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii); Treating appeal as an application for leave

The court held that the trial court’s parenting time modification did not change the parties’ child’s ECEs, and that neither its finding as to factor (j) nor its finding as to which school the child should attend were against the great weight of the evidence. Thus, the court affirmed the order at issue. As an initial matter, it concluded that plaintiff-mother “did not have an appeal as of right under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii)” but it addressed her appeal as if it were an application on which leave was granted. Her “parenting time was reduced by 26 days, which” was insufficient to change the child’s ECEs with the parties. Plaintiff made no effort to distinguish this case from Rains and did not suggest that the change in parenting time will change to whom the child looks for guidance and comfort. Her only argument was that the order relegated “her to a ‘weekend parent,’ but this assertion alone is not enough to show that the parenting-time modification” changed the ECEs and also ignored the circumstances here. This case was “distinguishable from Powery because the change in parenting time is slight, and the trial court made findings” as to the accessibility of the communities where the parties lived “and plaintiff’s ability to maintain an active role in” the child’s life. While she relied on Lieberman, that case also differed from this one. Next, the court rejected her claim that the trial court’s finding that she attempted to alienate the child from defendant-father was against the great weight of the evidence. Finally, as to the school selection, it “was not against the great weight of evidence for the trial court to find that” the school in which defendant wanted to enroll the child had a “lower student to teacher ratio because it was properly supported by the admitted evidence[.]” Further, it did not make its decision solely on this basis. It also “noted the wide range of resources and programs available” there and that defendant’s greater job flexibility made him more able to take and pick up the child from school.