42 USC § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution & unlawful arrest; Michigan state-law claims; Judicial immunity; Plausible allegations that defendant-judge was engaged in nonjudicial acts; Brookings v Clunk; Rockett ex rel KR v Eighmy (8th Cir); Distinguishing Orta v Repp (Unpub 6th Cir); Claim that the judge’s actions were performed in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction”

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-Till plausibly alleged that defendant-Judge King “was engaged in nonjudicial acts when dealing with” Till’s daughter (ELG) while she was in his courtroom during a vocational program for teenagers. Thus, it affirmed the district court’s ruling that Judge King was “not entitled to judicial immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of” the case. Plaintiff asserted malicious prosecution and unlawful arrest Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983 as well as state-law claims against Judge King, a Michigan district court judge. In this interlocutory appeal concerning Judge King’s argument that he was entitled to judicial immunity, the court addressed the two factors considered in determining “whether a particular act is ‘judicial’ or ‘non-judicial[.]’” The first factor is whether the act reflects a “function normally performed by a judge.” The court concluded the district court correctly found that Till “plausibly alleged that Judge King’s actions did not constitute” such a function. “To qualify as a judicial act, a judge’s actions must ‘further[] [an] official act or sanction.’” Till alleged “that Judge King had ELG locked in a ‘holding cell’ and conducted a ‘phony mock trial’ only because [he] was offended by ELG nodding off while he was lecturing about his career as a lawyer. And Judge King is alleged to have ‘admitted to the press’ that he was simply intending to ‘scare’ ELG because she had ‘disrespect[ed]’ him.” Till also alleged that there was “no case number, order, or any other court record associated with the events that transpired. This matters because the existence of a court record or order indicates that a judge’s actions constituted judicial acts.” As to the second factor, the court concluded the district court correctly determined that Till “plausibly alleged that Judge King was not acting in his judicial capacity when dealing with ELG.” Specifically, she “plausibly alleged that ELG encountered Judge King in his ‘private, non-judicial life’ as a lecturer or teacher.” And Till’s argument was “supported by the fact that, at the time of ELG’s ‘mock trial,’ court was no longer in session.” As to Till’s cross-appeal, the court held that the district court did not err in ruling that her alternate theory to overcome judicial immunity had no merit.