Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Title II; 42 USC § 12132; Rehabilitation Act; 29 USC § 794(a); Foster parent license; Reasonable accommodation; Fundamental alteration; 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7)(i); Individualized inquiry; PGA Tour, Inc v Martin; Sovereign immunity; Eleventh Amendment; Ex parte Young; Equal protection; Disability discrimination; Rational basis review; Summary judgment; Fed R Civ P 56(c)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and equal-protection claims because her proposed foster-care accommodation was not reasonable on this record. Plaintiff, a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair, applied to become a foster parent in Michigan, but the state administratively closed her application after concluding she could not physically provide necessary care. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. On appeal, the court first noted that categorically excluding people with severe physical disabilities from foster parenting “may violate” the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because those laws require an individualized assessment of whether reasonable accommodation would allow the applicant to perform parenting responsibilities. It also held that plaintiff sufficiently requested accommodation by proposing to act as the “brains of her operation” while aides would “act as her hands.” The court rejected defendants’ argument that each aide necessarily had to be separately licensed, noting the state had not shown Michigan’s scheme required that result and had conceded “that a quadriplegic could plausibly qualify as a solo foster parent.” But the court held that plaintiff’s existing “patchwork of formal and informal assistance” was unreasonable because her no-fault-funded aides were not allowed to assist others, there was no evidence those aides were “willing to undertake physical caregiving responsibilities for foster children,” and her informal support network lacked contracts, schedules, or documentation. It emphasized plaintiff was not barred from supplementing her application with “a more comprehensive third-party assistance plan.” The court also rejected her facial challenge because Michigan had licensed other applicants with disabilities, and it rejected her equal protection claim because defendants’ actions were rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring safe foster homes. Affirmed.