The Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); Sufficiency of the evidence; RICO conspiracy; Jury instruction; Indictment match; Charges related to a kidnapping & murder; Drug & money-laundering conspiracy; Distribution, possession, & conspiracy charges; Benefit required by the kidnapping statute; Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute; Jury empaneling; Expert testimony; Plain error review; FRE 403; Harmless error; Trial delay; Confrontation Clause; Mistrial motion; Severance; Prejudice; Theory-of-defense instruction; Constructive amendment; Duplicity; Nexus to interstate commerce; New trial motion; Pronouncement of sentence; Procedural reasonableness; Base offense level; Money laundering, leadership, & drug premises enhancements; Manager or supervisor enhancement; Substantive reasonableness; Effect of a within Guidelines sentence

In this RICO case involving a 75-count indictment and 7 defendants, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support convictions of (among other things) RICO conspiracy; kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering; drug and money-laundering conspiracy; distribution and possession with intent to distribute Oxymorphone; and convictions under the VICAR. It rejected their challenges related to the trial and its procedures under the plain error standard, and to their sentences. Defendants-Forrester, Frazier, Hern, Santiago, Stanley, Boylston, and Meyerholz were members or associates of a Tennessee chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club. On appeal, the court first upheld the RICO conspiracy convictions of Boylston, Frazier, Meyerholz, and Santiago. As to whether there was sufficient evidence of a criminal enterprise, it agreed “with the district court that defendants did ‘not come close to even raising a question about whether the Clarksville Mongols were functioning as an enterprise in the Spring of 2015.’” Further, the court has previously held that “‘an agreement to associate with and participate in a yet-to-be-formed racketeering enterprise that would affect interstate commerce constitutes a completed’ RICO conspiracy.” Finally, much of the group’s “criminal activity either affected interstate commerce or was conducted in interstate commerce.” Defendants’ issues related to the trial included a Confrontation Clause claim due to a three-week delay between direct and cross-examinations of a witness (H). The court focused on their ability to conduct cross-examination. Defense counsel was given “‘wide latitude’” to question H, which normally satisfies the right to confrontation. “And the cross-examinations gave the jury the information necessary to assess the defense’s theory of the case through an interrogation of [H’s] credibility, motives, and possible bias. So, no violation occurred.” The court noted that “jurors might be more likely to remember the more-recently presented cross than the three-week-old direct when they enter deliberations.” As to sentencing, the court rejected the challenges related to “the pronouncement of Frazier’s sentence,” procedural reasonableness, and substantive reasonableness. Affirmed.