Bindover; Preliminary exam; Probable cause; People v Henderson; CSC I; Person under 13; MCL 750.520b(1)(a); Sexual penetration; MCL 750.520a(r); Sexual contact; MCL 750.520a(q); Sexual purpose; People v Levran; People v Nyx; People v Lemons; Statutory interpretation; Fair import of penal code; MCL 750.2; Ejusdem generis; People v Burkman; Bona fide medical treatment or hygienic care by parent; Vagueness & overbreadth; Fundamental right to care for child; In re Sanders; Jury instruction; People v Jarman

The court held that sexual purpose is not an element of CSC I based on sexual penetration of a child under 13, but a parent’s bona fide medical treatment or hygienic care of a child is not sexual penetration. Defendant was charged with two counts of CSC I and child abuse after his infant twin sons were found with severe anal and rectal injuries, and he asserted that he had inserted wipes into their rectums to treat constipation. The district court bound him over on the CSC I counts and the circuit court denied his motion to quash. In this interlocutory appeal, the court first held that the prosecutor was not required to prove a sexual purpose. It reasoned that the definition of sexual penetration contains “no purpose-based limiting principle,” especially when contrasted with the immediately preceding definition of sexual contact, which expressly requires contact done for sexual arousal, “for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner.” The court next held that the catchall phrase in MCL 750.520a(r) does not cover every possible intrusion into a genital or anal opening. Applying ejusdem generis, it concluded that any “other intrusion” must be of the same “class or type” as sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, meaning the intrusion must be “in some sense, a sexual intrusion.” Thus, a parent who provides “bona fide, age-appropriate medical treatment or hygienic care” to a child does not violate the CSC I statutes merely because that care requires an intrusion into a genital or anal opening. This construction defeated defendant’s vagueness and overbreadth challenge because the statute did not criminalize a parent’s fundamental right and duty to care for a child. Finally, the court held the bindover was supported by probable cause because the nurse practitioner testified that the infants’ injuries were consistent with blunt-force penetrative trauma and that defendant’s claimed medical-care explanation was not consistent with the medical findings. Affirmed.