Directed verdict; Assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d(1); Lawful police action; Domestic violence arrest; MCL 764.15a; Fourth Amendment; Warrantless entry; Consent; Georgia v Randolph; Domestic violence investigation; City of Westland v Kodlowski; Other acts evidence; Domestic violence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; Propensity evidence; People v Propp; People v Cameron; Mistrial; Prosecutorial error; Presumption of innocence; Brady v Maryland violation; Suppression of evidence; Materiality; Duress instruction; People v Lemons; People v Kolanek; Right against self-incrimination; Juror bias; Impartial jury

The court held that officers lawfully entered the apartment to arrest defendant, the trial court properly admitted domestic-violence other-acts evidence, and defendant was not entitled to relief on his prosecutorial-error, Brady, duress-instruction, or juror-bias claims. He was convicted of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer and second-offense domestic violence after an incident involving his pregnant girlfriend. The trial court denied his directed-verdict motion, admitted evidence of a prior domestic-violence incident, denied a mistrial, refused a duress instruction, and allowed the case to proceed to the jury. On appeal, the court held that the warrantless entry was lawful because the victim consented and, under domestic-violence-investigation principles, a co-occupant’s refusal “does not preclude officers from continuing to investigate cases of potential domestic violence.” The court next held that the other-acts evidence was admissible under MCL 768.27b because both incidents involved defendant choking his pregnant girlfriend, making the evidence probative of his “propensity to choke his partner,” and any unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its value. It rejected the mistrial and prosecutorial-error claims because the evidence was properly admitted and the prosecutor was “free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences” from it. The court also held that defendant failed to establish a Brady violation because he did not show the prosecution suppressed the victim’s alleged prior statement that she initiated the physical altercation. It further held that a duress instruction was unwarranted because a reasonable person would not have feared death or serious bodily harm after repeated police warnings and opportunities to comply. Finally, the court rejected his juror-bias claim because he had one peremptory challenge remaining and expressed satisfaction with the jury. Affirmed.