Involuntary dismissal; MCR 2.504(B)(2); Undue influence; Presumption of undue influence; Fiduciary relationship; Guardian; MCL 700.1104(e); In re Estate of Karmey; Burden of production; In re Peterson Estate; Testamentary capacity; MCL 700.2501(2); In re Sprenger’s Estate; Rebuttal evidence; Credibility; Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia

The court held that the probate court did not err by denying appellant-son’s motion for involuntary dismissal or by finding that the decedent’s 2016 will was not the product of undue influence. A 2002 will benefited appellant and other children, but after the decedent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and became angry about appellant’s role in placing him in rehabilitation, he executed a 2016 will benefiting appellees-Daniel and Karen and disinheriting appellant and appellee-Nicholas. The probate court found that a presumption of undue influence applied, denied appellant’s motion for involuntary dismissal during the bench trial, and later admitted the 2016 will to probate. On appeal, the court first held that the probate court did not err by finding enough rebuttal evidence to continue the trial because witnesses described the decedent as “extremely strong-willed,” which supported that he acted “of his own free will,” and the probate court was not yet rendering judgment on the merits. The court next held that the probate court did not err on the final undue-influence ruling because “‘motive, opportunity, or even ability to control’” are insufficient absent affirmative evidence that influence was actually exercised. It reasoned that the decedent separately told his attorney that he “wants to redo his will,” that a psychologist had “no doubts” he was capable of making a new will, and that appellees were not present when the will was executed. The court concluded that, fair or not, the decedent had reasons for changing his estate plan, and the probate court did not err by finding those reasons were not based on undue influence. Affirmed.