Termination at initial disposition; Failure to make the requisite aggravated circumstances finding; Substantial rights; “Sibling” (MCL 712A.13a(1)(l)); “Sexual penetration” (MCL 750.520a(r) & 722.622(q)); Cunnilingus; People v Harris; Termination under § 19b(k)(ii); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re KV; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts

The court held that aggravating circumstances existed, that § (k)(ii) supported termination, and that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in his children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. The case arose from his “extensive sexual abuse of AD[,]” whose mother is also the mother of his children (KG and CG). Respondent argued that the trial court erred in terminating his “rights at the initial disposition without first determining that there were aggravated circumstances.” Reviewing the issue for plain error, the court found that the record plainly showed the trial court failed to “make the requisite findings of aggravated circumstances.” But it held that his substantial rights were not affected because aggravating circumstances existed given that “respondent had abused AD, who is a sibling of CG and KG, and the” record supported the trial court’s finding that “the abuse included sexual penetration.” As to a statutory ground for termination, the court concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in finding “that, based upon respondent’s sexual abuse of AD, there was a reasonable likelihood that KG and CG would be harmed if returned to” his care. While AD was approximately 9 years older than KG and 10 years older than CG, “respondent’s sexual abuse of AD” began when she was 7, and “involved multiple instances of sexual contact and penetration.” Given his “repeated and ongoing sexual abuse of one prepubescent girl that he treated as a daughter, there is a reasonable likelihood that he posed a danger to his prepubescent daughters.” Finally, given the record, the court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake in finding that termination of respondent[‘s] parental rights was in KG and CG’s best interests.”