e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86486
Opinion Date : 09/09/2026
e-Journal Date : 09/17/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Davis v. Highland Park Clerk
Practice Area(s) : Election Law Municipal
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Murray, Boonstra, and O’Brien
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Issues:

Removal of city employee candidates from the ballot; Eligibility under a city charter for candidacy for elected city offices; Claim that the charter provision was an unconstitutional First Amendment restraint on political speech; Case precedent upholding “resign-to-run” provisions; Clements v Fashing; Mandamus; Laches; Affidavits of identity (AOIs)

Summary

The court concluded that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in refusing to apply laches to all of plaintiff’s claims. Further, it did not err in granting his requested writ of mandamus directing defendant-city clerk to remove two unelected city employees from the November ballot as candidates for city elected offices. In this expedited election case, defendants first argued that the trial court erred by not ruling that plaintiff’s “claims for mandamus and declaratory relief—most of which were asserted in his initial complaint, rather than the” later filed amended complaint—were barred by laches. But plaintiff alleged that they “were responsible for most of the delay because City officials had refused to timely provide plaintiff with copies of the pertinent AOIs.” The court noted that in their brief on appeal, defendants did not even attempt “to refute that allegation. And as the parties asserting laches as an affirmative defense, they bear the burden of providing sufficient evidence to support its proposed application.” As to the grant of mandamus, plaintiff’s request was based on allegations that both candidates (W and L) “were, as City employees, ineligible for the offices they sought in light of § 4-3(e) of the Highland Park City Charter[.]” Defendants admitted on appeal that W and L were “unelected City employees at all relevant times. Defendants also admit that the language of § 4-3(e) plainly ‘requires City employees to resign employment in order to even be eligible for candidacy for’ elected City offices.” But they argued that § 4-3(e) was “‘an unconstitutional First Amendment restraint on political speech.’” While defendants relied on a trial court decision, the court found this reliance “entirely misplaced” in light of “the great weight of both binding and highly persuasive authority” contravening that decision.

Full PDF Opinion