e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86489
Opinion Date : 09/10/2026
e-Journal Date : 09/22/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Spence v. Village of Sebewaing
Practice Area(s) : Municipal Zoning
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - M.J. Kelly, O'Brien, and Lievense
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Issues:

Subject-matter jurisdiction; MCR 2.116(C)(4); Zoning board of appeals; Michigan Zoning Enabling Act; MCL 125.3605; Timely appeal; MCL 125.3606(3); MCR 7.122(A); Collateral attack; Zelasko v Charter Twp of Bloomfield; Quality Mkt v Detroit Bd of Zoning Appeals; Takings & due process claims; Ripeness; Rule of finality; Cummins v Robinson Twp; Building & soil-erosion permits; Construction Board of Appeals; MCL 125.1514; Motion to compel; MCR 2.116(H)

Summary

The court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs-property owners’ claims against defendant-village because the complaint was an untimely collateral attack on the zoning board of appeals’ decision, and their claims against defendant-county were not ripe. The Spences obtained permits to build a waterfront home, but after construction stalled, the village determined the zoning permit had expired and the zoning board denied their request for a new permit or variance. The county also told them their building and soil-erosion permits had expired. On appeal, the court held that the claims against the village were barred because MCL 125.3605 provides that a zoning board decision “shall be final,” subject to timely circuit-court appeal, and the complaint’s gravamen was to overturn that decision. It rejected the Spences’ claim that MCR 7.122(A)(2) allowed an unrestricted original action, reasoning that such a reading would nullify the zoning-appeal procedure. As to the county, the court held that the claims were not ripe because the Spences never reapplied for permits or challenged the county’s expiration decision, leaving a “complete failure to challenge any aspect” of that decision. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to compel because the Spences did not provide the required MCR 2.116(H) affidavits. Affirmed.

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