Case evaluation sanctions; Former MCR 2.403(O); MCR 1.102; Sufficiency of plaintiffs’ motion; Whether the verdict was sufficiently favorable to preclude sanctions; Former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) (cases involving multiple parties); Frank v William A Kibbe & Assoc, Inc; Broadway Coney Island, Inc v Commercial Union Ins Cos; Aggregate verdict; Sanctions under MCR 1.109(E) on the basis the motion was not adequately supported by law; Distinguishing Wolfson v Grech (Unpub); Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)

The court held that “plaintiffs obtained an aggregate verdict more favorable than the aggregate evaluation” and thus, former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) prohibited the imposition of case-evaluation sanctions against them. It affirmed the trial court’s order requiring the return of the case-evaluation sanctions paid to defendants after the first trial. It also affirmed the denial of defendants’ motion for reconsideration and the trial court’s refusal to sanction two of the plaintiffs. The sanctions were awarded during plaintiffs’ prior appeal. “The parties then entered a stipulated order under which plaintiffs paid $48,000, or 110% of the sanctions award, to defendants’ counsel.” After the first appeal, there was a retrial, and a jury awarded plaintiffs $4,344 against defendant-Cosmopolitan Homes and $4,344.05 against defendant-Wicker, for an aggregate verdict of $8,688.05. The case evaluation panel had entered a $6,000 evaluation in their favor against Wicker. In this appeal, the court first rejected defendants’ assertion “that plaintiffs’ motion for return of the $48,000 was fatally deficient[.]” As to the merits, former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) applied as multiple parties were involved. The court held in Frank “that an aggregate verdict is ‘more favorable’ for purposes of MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) only if it exceeds the aggregate evaluation by more than the 10% required by MCR 2.403(O)(3).” Here, the aggregate case evaluation was $6,000 and the aggregate verdict was $8,688.05. “Former MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) expressly protects a plaintiff who obtains the more favorable aggregate result.” The court also noted that the “parties’ stipulated order provided for reimbursement if [it] reversed and remanded for trial and plaintiffs were thereafter deemed the prevailing parties. Both conditions were satisfied.” Finally, the court rejected defendants’ arguments “that plaintiffs should have been sanctioned under MCR 1.109(E) because their motion for return of the funds was not adequately supported by law” and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion for reconsideration.