Motion to quash; Resisting-or-obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d(1); Reasonable suspicion for a brief stop; People v Prude; Approaching a person in a public place & attempting to ask questions; People v Williams; Consideration of defendant’s flight under the totality of the circumstances; Distinguishing United States v Jeter (6th Cir); Admission of alleged hearsay; Statement offered to explain why a police officer acted as the officer did; People v Chambers

The court held that defendant’s motion to quash a resisting or obstructing charge was properly denied because under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion when they ordered him to stop. It also rejected his hearsay claim because the statement in question was offered to show why an officer (V) located and approached him, not to show that a bulge actually existed in defendant’s pocket. Defendant argued that the charge should have been quashed because the officers did not have “reasonable suspicion when they ordered him to stop.” The court disagreed. Before V issued the command, he “knew that defendant was walking at 11:15 p.m. in an area associated with violent crime. [V] personally observed defendant wearing dark clothing and a ski mask and walking across an open field. He had also received” an FBI agent’s (G) “firsthand report that defendant kept his hands in the front pocket of his hoodie and appeared to have a bulge in that area. Defendant then fled as [V] opened the door of a marked patrol vehicle, before [V] could utter a word. [V] also had encountered several other individuals there who wore ski masks and dark clothing while unlawfully carrying firearms.” While being present “in a high-crime area does not, by itself, establish reasonable suspicion[,]” and wearing a ski mask in December is not inherently suspicious, “facts that are insufficient separately may establish reasonable suspicion” when considered collectively. And G’s report “contributed to the officers’ suspicion.” The court further found that defendant’s “immediate flight provided the final and most significant circumstance.” In contrast to the defendant in Prude, he “fled before any command or detention.” Because the “officers had reasonable suspicion when they ordered defendant to stop[,]” the command was lawful. He kept “running after the emergency lights and siren were activated, and he later acknowledged that he then knew the police were pursuing him.” Thus, the preliminary exam evidence “supported a reasonable belief that [he] knowingly failed to comply with a lawful police command.”