Engaging a minor for commercial sexual activity (MCL 750.462e(a)); Sufficiency of the evidence; Sentencing; Proportionality; Imposition of an upward departure sentence without explanation; Waiver of jury instruction claims

While the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s engaging a minor for commercial sexual activity conviction, it vacated his sentence because the trial court provided no explanation for its upward departure from the guidelines. Thus, it affirmed his conviction but remanded for resentencing. On appeal, the court first concluded that defendant waived his jury instruction claims when “defense counsel stated that he had ‘[n]o objection’ to” the instructions given. As to his sufficiency claim, the court held that the “evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant ‘recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained’” the victim (IJ) “‘for commercial sexual activity’ with the intent that she would perform such activity. [His] conduct in repeatedly pressuring the girls to engage in sexual activity for money supports a finding that he recruited or enticed the girls into performing commercial sexual activity. Evidence that he paid for the Uber that transported” them to an address and immediately asked them “to engage in prostitution supports an inference that [he] arranged or paid for IJ’s transportation to the house for that purpose. Further, IJ’s testimony that [a codefendant] paid defendant for her services, and defendant then paid her, supports a finding that defendant provided IJ for commercial sexual activity.” The court noted that a “conviction under MCL 750.462e does not require that the minor be unwilling, and defendant’s statement that IJ ‘could make money,’ coupled with his subsequent payment to her, supports the inference that he induced the transaction and intended that it occur. The jury was entitled to disbelieve [his] testimony that he did not arrange for or profit from any sexual activity at the house.” But the trial court’s failure to justify the upward departure in sentencing him to 6 to 20 years when his guidelines range was 3 to 5 years constituted an abuse of discretion.