Possession with intent to deliver meth; MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i); Maintaining a drug house; MCL 333.7405(1)(d); Other-acts evidence; MRE 404(b); MRE 403; Limiting instruction; MRE 105; Double jeopardy; Separate prosecutions; Blockburger v United States; Alternative theory of guilt; People v Urbanski; General unanimity instruction; M Crim JI 3.11(3); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Right to counsel at critical stage; Fourth Amendment; Arrest warrant; Protective sweep; Plain view; Search warrant; Probable cause; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Confrontation Clause; Invited error

The court held that the 3/29 raid evidence was properly admitted as other-acts evidence and did not create a double-jeopardy, unanimity, or ineffective assistance of counsel basis for reversal. It also rejected his right-to-counsel, search-and-seizure, confrontation, and other ineffective-assistance claims. Defendant was convicted of possessing meth with intent to deliver and maintaining a drug house after officers entered his garage residence to execute an arrest warrant on 9/11, saw suspected meth and a pipe in plain view, obtained a search warrant, and recovered meth, scales, packaging materials, mail, and a debit card. The trial court also admitted evidence from the 3/29 raid at the same location, including defendant’s recorded statements about drug-dealing practices. On appeal, the court first held that the 3/29 evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b) because it was probative of knowledge, intent, and common scheme, and its volume did not substantially outweigh its value where intent to deliver was the “central dispute at trial.” The court next held that double jeopardy was not violated because the 3/29 conduct was not submitted as an alternative theory of guilt, and the jury was instructed that other-acts evidence involved conduct “for which he is not on trial” and that it “must not convict” him because of other bad conduct. It also held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a more specific limiting instruction, a narrower date range, or a specific unanimity instruction because defendant failed to show prejudice and the prosecution tried the 9/11 events as the charged conduct. The court further held that the prior right-to-counsel violation in defendant’s earlier case did not taint this case, the arrest warrant allowed officers to enter the residence when they reasonably believed defendant was inside, and any suppression motion would have been futile. Finally, the court held that the challenged officer testimony was invited by defense counsel and, in any event, was not hearsay because it explained “‘why police officers acted as they did.’” Affirmed.