Motion to correct an invalid sentence; Delayed sentence agreement; MCL 771.1(2); People v Smith; People v Cannon; Imposition of a jail sentence after successful completion of a delay period; Failure to explicitly state the reason for the delayed sentence; Harmless error; Intermediate sanction; MCL 769.34(4)(a); MCL 769.31(b); Whether the reasons articulated for the jail sentence were based on factors accounted for in the PRV score; Ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence (JOS); Presentence investigation report (PSIR)

The court held that defendant-Degen’s sentence of 365 days in jail was not invalid and thus, the trial court properly denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence. His sentence did not violate MCL 771.1(2), and the trial court did not violate MCL 769.31(b) and 769.34(4) by imposing a jail term instead of an intermediate sanction. The parties entered into a plea agreement with delayed sentencing, under which, upon “successful completion of the conditions, the prosecution would agree to reduce his first-degree home invasion charges to third-degree home invasion[.]’” It also stated there was no sentencing agreement. Defendant complied with the conditions. The PSIR recommended the trial court “grant the terms of the delay and sentence Degen to two days in jail with two days of jail credit.” The trial court dismissed the first-degree home invasion charges and added the third-degree home invasion convictions, but declined to adopt the sentencing recommendation. On appeal, the court noted that nothing in MCL 771.1(2) “requires a trial court to sentence a defendant to probation after the delay, even when a defendant complies with the conditions of the delay.” Because he established “eligibility for leniency at the end of the 11-month period, the trial court reduced Degen’s most serious charges from first-degree home invasion to third-degree home invasion, which resulted in a considerable reduction of his” guidelines range. The court concluded that “a sentence involving incarceration in jail following a defendant’s successful completion of a delay period is not necessarily improper under MCL 771.1(2), and Degen” did not show “that the trial court was obligated to sentence him to probation.” Further, any procedural error in its failing “to explicitly state the reason for the delayed sentence” at the time of the plea was harmless. As to his intermediate sanction argument, “the trial court adequately stated reasonable grounds to sentence him to one year” in jail under MCL 769.34(4)(a). Affirmed but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting his JOS to reflect his third-degree home invasion convictions and sentences.