Children’s best interests; Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re Kellogg; In re Mota; In re LaFrance; Parent-child bond; Consideration of relative placement; In re Atchley; In re Olive/Metts; “Relative” (MCL 712A.13a(1)(j))

The court held that the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, but its failure to consider the children’s relative placement in making its best-interests determination required reversal. The case arose because of respondent-father’s sexual abuse of his children’s half-sister (S). On appeal, he only challenged the trial court’s finding that terminating his parental rights was in his children’s best interests. He contended it erred by applying the anticipatory neglect doctrine “because he treated his seven children different from how he treated” their mother’s (nonrespondent-JB) two children from her prior relationship. He also asserted that S, “age 11, was significantly older than his children, who were all under age four.” The court found his arguments unavailing. He was S’s stepfather, and she “referred to him as her ‘stepdad’ while testifying. She lived together with respondent, JB, and her eight siblings and half-siblings before JB became aware of the sexual abuse. She did not tell anyone what [he] was doing to her because she was scared and thought she would ‘lose everything’ if she did.” While he contended he treated her “‘drastically different’ from how he treated his own children, the record” did not support this claim. The court concluded this case was “more like Mota than Kellogg or LaFrance.” Further, it found reasonable the trial court’s concern about “the possibility of mental harm to the children in light of respondent’s repeated denials of wrongdoing and claims of fabrication” by JB and S. It noted that he tried “to convince JB not to say anything about what she witnessed and to persuade” S not to say anything about his conduct. The court next determined that he erroneously asserted a bond with the children, “which weighed against termination, but the absence of a bond was not a key factor in the [trial] court’s best-interests determination in any event.” However, because “the trial court failed to consider the children’s placement with JB when it” made its best-interests determination, the court vacated that determination and remanded, retaining jurisdiction.