Petition seeking review of an administrative order; Motion to dismiss due to the lack of a final order; Presumption of required finality; Bell v New Jersey; Whether Congress rebutted the presumption when it enacted the Mine Safety & Health Act; 30 USC § 816(a)(1); § 816(b); Whether the Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission’s remand order satisfied the finality requirement; Finality’s requirements; Bennett v Spear; Administrative law judge (ALJ)

In an order, the court held that “Congress did not rebut the presumption of finality when it enacted the Mine Safety and Health Act and authorized review of the agency’s decisions.” Thus, because the administrative order for which petitioner-Cargill sought review was not a final one, it granted respondent-Secretary’s motion to dismiss the petition. An inspector from the Mine Safety and Health Administration cited “Cargill for a ‘significant and substantial’ violation” of the Act. Cargill contested it before an ALJ. The ALJ vacated the citation. The Secretary petitioned for review before respondent-Commission, which reversed and remanded to the ALJ with instructions to “determine the appropriate penalty amount after resolving any outstanding issues, such as the ‘significant and substantial’ nature of the violation.” Instead of waiting for the ALJ to do so, Cargill petitioned for review. The court noted that unless Congress directs otherwise, it “may review administrative decisions only after the agency process results in a final order.” And Congress did not rebut the presumption of finality here. The Act gives the court “authority to review an appeal of ‘[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by’” a Commission order. “Mere permission to review ‘an order’ by the agency does not alter the background imperative of finality.” The court noted that “every circuit to consider this issue has concluded that the Act does not rebut Bell’s strong finality presumption.” While Cargill pointed “to an express finality requirement in § 816(b) when the Secretary files an appeal[,]” the court found that simply using “‘final’ elsewhere in the same statute does not suffice to alter the customary reading of ‘order’ in administrative-review provisions.” And it concluded that “Congress wanted to specify the Secretary as an additional holder of the review right, not to impose a materially different condition on that right.” The court also rejected Cargill’s argument “that, even if § 816(a)(1) requires finality, the Commission’s remand order” satisfied it. There are two conditions for finality, and it has “long recognized that orders remanding for further administrative proceedings do not satisfy” them.