Duress defense; United States v Johnson; Continuing offense under 8 USC § 1326(a); Immediate threat; Reckless placement in the situation; Reasonable legal alternatives; Bona fide surrender effort; Speedy Trial Act; 18 USC § 3161(c)(1); Initial appearance in charging district; Judicially created exception; Substantive reasonableness; § 3553(a); Within-Guidelines presumption; United States v Vonner

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court properly barred defendant from presenting a duress defense, correctly rejected his Speedy Trial Act claim, and imposed a substantively reasonable 48-month sentence. Defendant, a Mexican citizen who had never received legal permission to enter the United States, had previously been removed twice and convicted of illegally being found in the country after removal. After again entering the United States sometime between 2016 and 2019, he remained undetected for at least five years before being charged under § 1326(a). He sought to argue that he reentered under duress because the Sinaloa cartel, for which he previously sold drugs, was trying to kill him. The district court barred the defense, denied his Speedy Trial Act motion, and after his jury conviction imposed a within-Guidelines 48-month sentence. On appeal, the court concluded that the proposed duress defense “fails at nearly every step.” Defendant remained unlawfully in the country for years without surrendering, failed to identify an imminent threat when he crossed the border, had voluntarily joined the cartel, and did not show that he lacked reasonable legal alternatives such as seeking police assistance, relocating within Mexico, or traveling elsewhere. The court found that he “failed to establish nearly every element of duress.” It also rejected the Speedy Trial Act claim. Under § 3161(c)(1), “the timer begins when the defendant has an initial appearance in the specific district where the charge is pending, even if he had a prior initial appearance in another district.” Excluding the period before defendant’s Western District of Michigan appearance left only 34 days before trial, well within the 70-day limit. Finally, the court found the sentence substantively reasonable because the district court considered defendant’s childhood trauma but weighed it against his repeated unlawful entries and extensive criminal history. His argument “‘ultimately boils down to an assertion that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently,’” which was beyond the scope of the court’s appellate review. Affirmed.