Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to identify statute-of-limitations issue as to dismissed strangulation charge; Other acts of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b(1); MRE 403; Alleged vouching; Hearsay & prior consistent statements; MRE 801(d)(1)(B); Other acts of sexual abuse; MCL 768.27a; People v Watkins; Confrontation Clause; Admission of Arizona interview video; Davis v Washington; Cumulative error; Cruel or unusual punishment; Lifetime Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) registration; People v Kardasz; Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); People v Hallak; Unreasonable search

The court held that defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel and rejected his constitutional challenges to lifetime SORA registration and electronic monitoring. He was convicted of two counts of CSC I and one count of CSC II involving a victim under 13 and received concurrent prison terms, lifetime Tier III SORA registration, and LEM. After the trial court denied his postjudgment motion, defendant raised several ineffective assistance claims on appeal. The court agreed that counsel performed deficiently by failing to identify the statute-of-limitations problem with a strangulation charge that was ultimately dismissed, but found no prejudice because the victim’s testimony about the strangulation remained admissible. It explained that the incident “was relevant to the jury’s evaluation of whether the victim was telling the truth about the alleged sexual misconduct,” and ultimately concluded that objections to the victim’s testimony concerning the strangulation, a separate slap, and domestic violence against her mother “would have been properly overruled.” Counsel’s failure to object to a friend’s alleged vouching was reasonable trial strategy because it avoided drawing further attention to the testimony. As to challenged hearsay from the friend and a former boyfriend, the court found no reasonable probability of a different result even assuming some testimony was objectionable. It likewise concluded that testimony by the victim’s mother and defendant’s former fiancée about domestic violence was admissible under MCL 768.27b(1) and MRE 403, while defendant’s sister’s testimony about prior sexual abuse was admissible under MCL 768.27a and MRE 403. Defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim concerning his Arizona interview also failed because “the only testimonial statements were by defendant, not the Arizona officers.” The court found no reversible cumulative error. Turning to punishment, it rejected defendant’s SORA challenge because his as-applied claim was “hardly distinguishable from that rejected in Kardasz.” It also rejected the LEM challenge because “Hallak is binding precedent, and defendant offers no convincing way to distinguish this case from it.” Finally, under Hallak, LEM was not an unreasonable search given defendant’s reduced privacy interest and the public interest in monitoring offenders convicted of CSC against young children. Affirmed.