Domestic PPO; MCL 600.2950(1)(a) & (4); Reasonable cause; Entry into jointly owned marital home; MCL 600.2950(5); Legitimate-purpose provisions; MCL 750.411h(1)(c) & MCL 750.411i(1)(d); Distinguishing Pickering v Pickering

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering a PPO that prohibited respondent-husband from entering the parties’ jointly owned marital home because reasonable cause existed to believe he might again enter without petitioner-wife’s consent or court approval. Petitioner and respondent were divorcing and jointly owned the marital home. After an earlier PPO and extension expired in 10/24, respondent called petitioner on 10/26/24 seeking to retrieve belongings. She responded through AppClose that he should provide a list and arrange for a police civil standby. About two hours later, respondent entered the home with one of the parties’ children and removed property from the garage. Petitioner returned, blocked his vehicle, and called police. The trial court credited petitioner’s testimony, expressed concern over respondent’s use of self-help while property distribution remained at issue in the divorce, and entered the 2024 PPO. On appeal, the court concluded that the record supported the reasonable-cause finding. Respondent had proceeded despite petitioner’s express objection and admitted as to her request for a civil standby that he “didn’t consider that a deterrent.” The court stated that it was “not definitely and firmly convinced the trial court mistakenly found reasonable cause to believe respondent may again attempt to enter the marital home without consent or court approval.” His joint ownership did not require a different result because MCL 600.2950(5)’s limitation did not encompass spouses with joint property interests. Even assuming respondent had a legal right to enter, he “provides no legal support for the apparent proposition that his ownership interest in the property, alone, permitted him to enter it over petitioner’s objection under these circumstances.” His reliance on the legitimate-purpose provisions governing stalking and aggravated stalking was also misplaced because neither offense formed the basis for the PPO, and Pickering involved a different statutory subsection. Affirmed.