First Amendment retaliation under 42 USC § 1983; Causation; No-probable-cause rules; Hartman v Moore; Nieves v Bartlett; Criminal citations; Civil parking enforcement; Qualified immunity; Municipal liability under Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Selective-enforcement claims forfeiture; Prior restraint; Permit discretion; Thomas v Chicago Park Dist; Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure; Community-caretaking impoundment; Standardized criteria

The court held that plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims against defendant-mayor (King), defendant-chief of staff (Smedley), and defendant-City should be revived, while defendant-police chief (Gardner) was entitled to qualified immunity and the remaining constitutional claims failed. Plaintiff-resident (Fambrough) used a sound truck registered to plaintiff-company to broadcast political messages criticizing East Cleveland’s administration and supporting the mayor’s opponent. City officials subsequently enforced parking and noise ordinances against him, impounded the truck, and prosecuted the noise violation. The district court resolved all claims for defendants. On appeal, the court first clarified the causation rules governing the retaliation claims. It concluded that Hartman governed the noise prosecution, Nieves governed the noise citation, and neither rule governed the civil parking citation or impoundment. It explained that “issuing a citation is more like an arrest than a prosecutor’s decision to bring charges” and it “decline[d] to extend either Hartman or Nieves to the parking-related actions here.” As to King and Smedley, plaintiff plausibly alleged an absence of probable cause for noise enforcement and retaliatory causation for the parking actions. The court concluded, taking “Fambrough’s allegations as true, no reasonable official in King’s or Smedley’s position would believe that he was acting lawfully.” As to theCity, the court found plaintiff “raised a genuine dispute of material fact on whether City officials’ retaliatory motive led to the adverse actions.” It vacated and remanded the municipal-liability claim because the district court had not determined whose decisions constituted official policy and directly caused the violation. Gardner, however, received qualified immunity because “we’ve never held that the defendant’s knowledge of another’s retaliatory intent imputes that intent on to the defendant’s actions.” The court also concluded that plaintiff forfeited his selective-enforcement claims by failing to develop them. It rejected the facial prior-restraint challenge because the permit standard “isn’t so vague that the decision to grant or deny an application is left ‘to the whim of the administrator.’” Finally, it affirmed summary disposition on the Fourth Amendment claim. Because the truck was illegally parked on a residential street, “the police had an objective justification for impounding” it, and the city’s impoundment policy was “sufficiently standardized.” Reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.