Motion to suppress; Probable cause for a search warrant; Limitation on DEA operational plan evidence; Plain error review; Rights to confrontation & to present a defense; FRE 402 & 403; Relevance; Misleading or confusing the jury; Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree murder of a federal officer; 18 USC §§ 1111 & 1114; Lying in wait; Premeditation; Self-defense; Jury instructions; Due Process Clause; Intentional killing while engaging in a drug-trafficking offense; § 848(e)(1); Pinkerton liability (co-conspirator liability); Foreseeability; “Engaging in an offense punishable under” § 841(b)(1)(A); Substantive-connection requirement; Participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy; Possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute; Aiding & abetting; Life sentence; Procedural & substantive reasonableness

The court held that defendant-Goddard’s motion to suppress was properly denied, and that the district court’s limitation on evidence about the DEA’s operational plan did not violate his and defendant-Cortner’s constitutional rights or the FREs. It also held that sufficient evidence supported Goddard’s first-degree murder of a federal officer (D) conviction, both defendants’ convictions of intentionally killing D while engaging in a drug-trafficking offense, and Cortner’s convictions of participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy and possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute. Finally, it held that Cortner’s life sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. The case arose from the execution of a search warrant by federal law-enforcement agents. Goddard fatally shot D during the search. On appeal, among other things, Goddard and Cortner argued “that the district court’s decision to limit testimony about the operational plan violated their constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense.” Reviewing the issue for plain error, the court found that they could not “clear that ‘high bar.’” It noted that “courts have excluded similar evidence for the reasons the district court gave here.” Thus, they could not “show that the district court’s decision is ‘clearly contrary to the law’ in this Circuit.” As to their FRE arguments, it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling “that the operational-plan evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under Rule 402” and, alternatively, that it “could mislead the jury and thus barred its admission under Rule 403.” The court also rejected Cortner’s arguments challenging his conviction under § 848(e)(1) for intentionally killing D. It held that the district court did not commit legal error in instructing the jury that it could convict him “using a Pinkerton theory of co-conspirator liability,” concluding that “Pinkerton liability is not plainly inconsistent with § 848(e)(1).” And the Pinkerton instruction did not “plainly violate the Due Process Clause.” The court also held that the evidence was sufficient “to satisfy the elements of Pinkerton liability.” A rational jury could have found that Goddard killed D “to advance the charged drug-trafficking conspiracy” and that the killing “was reasonably foreseeable to Cortner.” Affirmed.