Claims against a school district & employee arising from an auto accident; Governmental agency immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); Motor-vehicle exception (MCL 691.1405); Requirement that a plaintiff plead facts in avoidance of immunity; Mack v City of Detroit; Notice pleading; Whether the complaint had to contain “magic words”; Employee immunity; MCL 691.1407(2); “Gross negligence” (MCL 691.1407(8)(a)); Motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7); Roseville Community Schools (RCS); Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)

The court held that the facts asserted in plaintiff’s complaint clearly alleged a cause of action under the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity as to defendant-school district (RCS). Further, plaintiff presented “evidence tending to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether” defendant-employee (Cremonte) was grossly negligent. Thus, the court affirmed the order denying defendants’ summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7). As to RCS, the “complaint alleged that plaintiff was injured as a result of Cremonte’s negligent or grossly negligent operation of a van owned by RCS during the course of Cremonte’s employment with RCS. [It] further laid out the facts underlying this claim—that Cremonte, while driving a vehicle owned by RCS during the course of his employment, was driving southbound on Groesbeck Highway when he crossed into the northbound lane of travel and collided with plaintiff’s vehicle, causing injury to plaintiff. These facts plainly alleged a cause of action” under MCL 691.1405. Rather than engage with the facts alleged, defendants focused “on what is supposedly missing from the complaint—any mention of the GTLA, governmental immunity, or a host of words and phrases. But” they did not cite any case law “supporting their contention that plaintiff’s complaint needed to use some combination of these ‘magic words’ to plead his claim in avoidance of governmental immunity. This, presumably, is because requiring the use of specific words or phrases to state a claim would be inconsistent with Michigan’s general pleading requirements.” As to Cremonte, in response to the summary disposition motion, plaintiff attached the traffic crash report describing the collision. It “detailed how Cremonte drifted across the center lane of Groesbeck Highway into traffic going the opposite direction, then collided with multiple other motor vehicles until colliding with the front of plaintiff’s vehicle and coming to rest on top of plaintiff’s vehicle. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that Cremonte’s conduct of drifting into oncoming traffic and colliding with multiple vehicles was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury result.”