Quiet title; Sua sponte summary disposition; MCR 2.116(I)(1) & (C)(7); Impermissible collateral attack; Foreclosure by advertisement; Expiration of redemption period; MCL 600.3236; Subject-matter jurisdiction; MCL 600.5704; Consent judgment

The court held that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s quiet-title action because it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a district court judgment awarding possession of the property to nonparty-Comerica Bank. Defendant-Probst mortgaged the property, Comerica subsequently acquired the mortgage and purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale after foreclosure, and Probst failed to redeem it. Comerica then obtained a district court judgment granting it possession. Plaintiff-LaMie, an occupant of the property, recorded a lien based on an alleged agreement with Probst and later filed this action seeking quiet title. Afterward, he recorded an affidavit purporting to expunge Comerica’s sheriff’s deed, and Probst executed a quitclaim deed transferring the property to him. The trial court refused to enter a proposed consent judgment between LaMie and Probst and dismissed the action. On appeal, the court explained that, assuming competent jurisdiction, “‘a party cannot use a second proceeding to attack a tribunal’s decision in a previous proceeding.’” The parties sought to use this action to relitigate the foreclosure and LaMie’s asserted ownership based on the same agreement, liens, affidavits, and quitclaim deed he had previously raised. “There is simply no discernable difference between the arguments LaMie raised in the Comerica case and the arguments he raised in the underlying case and in this appeal.” His avenue for challenging the district court judgment was a direct appeal in that proceeding. Although a collateral attack may be permitted against a void judgment entered without personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, neither LaMie nor Probst established such a defect. The district court had statutory jurisdiction over the summary possession proceeding and jurisdiction over the property. Thus, the collateral attack was impermissible. Affirmed.