Motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds; Whether a prior order declaring a mistrial was properly rescinded; MCR 6.435(B); People v Jones

The court held that even assuming that the second trial court judge involved in this case “could and did properly rely on MCR 6.435(B) to rescind his mistrial declaration,” his decision to do so was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. The case was originally assigned to Judge R, but the bench trial had to be adjourned, and before it resumed, Judge R went on medical leave. The case was reassigned to Judge H, who “proposed declaring a mistrial so that the case could be resolved before a different factfinder, but defendant insisted on finishing the trial he started before” Judge R. Judge H later sua sponte declared a mistrial. Before “the new trial began, the case was reassigned back to” Judge R, who referred defendant’s motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds back to Judge H. Instead of ruling on whether a second prosecution could proceed, Judge H “rescinded his order declaring a mistrial so that the original proceedings before” Judge R could resume. On appeal, the court considered only whether Judge H erred in rescinding his mistrial order. It found that, under “Jones’s interpretation of MCR 6.435(B), this was not a valid use of MCR 6.435(B). That rule, according to the majority in Jones, can only be used to alter a ruling that was based on a mistaken belief in the facts or the applicable law, and according to Judge [H], his decision to declare a mistrial was based on neither. But even under the broader interpretation of” the rule advocated for in the Jones dissent, it was questionable whether Judge H’s decision was permitted. The court determined that, in any event, it was “significant that (1) defendant was forced to spend time and resources litigating a second trial for a significant period of time before Judge [H] rescinded his order declaring a mistrial, and (2) Judge” H only did so “after defendant moved to dismiss the second prosecution of him on double-jeopardy grounds. Under these circumstances, rescinding the mistrial declaration 16 months after it was entered was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” The court reversed the order rescinding the mistrial order, vacated the order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss as moot, and remanded for the trial court to address the substance of his motion to dismiss.