Constitutional right to a speedy trial; Barker v Wingo factors; 26-month pretrial delay; Other-acts evidence; MCL 768.27a; MRE 403; People v Watkins; Prior CSC II conviction; Authentication of Snapchat messages; MRE 901; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); MCL 750.520b(2)(c); Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963 art 1, § 16; People v Brown; People v Parks; People v Taylor; Prior-conviction sentencing enhancement; Almendarez-Torres v United States; Apprendi v New Jersey

The court held that defendant’s approximately 26-month pretrial delay did not violate his speedy-trial rights, the challenged other-acts and Snapchat evidence was properly admitted, and his mandatory LWOP sentences under MCL 750.520b(2)(c) were constitutional as applied to him. Defendant was convicted of six counts of CSC I involving a child under 13 and accosting a child for an immoral purpose. Although the delay exceeded 18 months and was presumptively prejudicial, application of the other Barker factors showed that relatively little delay was attributable to the prosecution, some resulted from court-system problems and pretrial proceedings, and defendant contributed to the delay by obtaining new counsel shortly before trial. He also did not show prejudice to his defense. Balancing the factors, the court held that “the prosecution overcame the presumption and defendant’s speedy trial rights under the United States and Michigan Constitutions were not violated.” The trial court also properly admitted defendant’s 2002 CSC II conviction under MCL 768.27a. Although approximately 20 years separated the offenses, defendant spent 12 of those years incarcerated, the offenses shared relevant similarities, and the prior conviction was reliable. The court emphasized that propensity evidence authorized by MCL 768.27a may not be excluded under MRE 403 merely because it permits a propensity inference. The Snapchat messages were also sufficiently authenticated through the victim’s testimony and their content. The prosecution made the required prima facie showing that a reasonable juror could find the messages were exchanged between defendant and the victim, leaving their ultimate weight to the jury. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s argument that Parks and Taylor rendered mandatory LWOP unconstitutional because the prior CSC offense triggering the enhancement occurred when he was about 18. Those cases concerned sentencing offenders for crimes committed during late adolescence. Here, defendant committed the six sentencing offenses when he was approximately 37 or 38. Thus, “the statute here does not impose LWOP for a single CSC I conviction defendant committed when he was about 18, it enhances the applicable penalty for his conduct when he was in his late 30s.” The court likewise rejected his federal constitutional challenge because the prior-conviction exception recognized in Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi remains binding, and the victim’s age was already an element of his prior CSC II conviction. Affirmed.