Other-acts evidence; Allegedly unlawful marijuana business; MRE 404(b) & 403; People v VanderVliet; Self-defense instructions; Waiver; Self-Defense Act (SDA); MCL 780.972(1); Vagueness; Second Amendment; District of Columbia v Heller; Deadlocked-jury instruction; M Crim JI 3.12; People v Walker; Juror misconduct; Extraneous influences; MRE 606(b); People v Budzyn; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Duress instruction; Cumulative error

The court held that 1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence concerning defendant’s allegedly unlawful marijuana business, 2) he waived his challenge to the self-defense instructions, 3) his constitutional challenges to the SDA failed, and 4) he was not entitled to relief based on the deadlocked-jury instruction, juror misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, or cumulative error. He shot the decedent six times after the decedent and another man broke into a barn on defendant’s property to steal marijuana. Defendant later burned the decedent’s body and disposed of evidence, claiming he initially acted in self-defense and later feared retaliation against his family. The jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, mutilation of a dead body, concealing a death, and felony-firearm. On appeal, the court concluded that evidence concerning defendant’s marijuana operation was properly admitted under MRE 404(b) to show motive and intent. It was relevant to the prosecution’s theory that he acted “with the purpose of protecting his enterprise as opposed to in defense of himself or his family,” and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Defendant waived his instructional challenge by expressly approving the self-defense instructions. His constitutional challenges also failed because the SDA did not infringe the Second Amendment and was not vague in limiting its no-duty-to-retreat protection to a person who was “not engaged in the commission of a crime” when deadly force was used. The court further found no coercion from the standard deadlocked-jury instruction. The jury continued deliberating for three days afterward, received breaks, and affirmatively requested additional deliberation time. Although a juror improperly consulted his attorney son-in-law and relayed information to the jury, defendant failed to identify what information was conveyed or establish a “real and substantial possibility” that it affected the verdict. Finally, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the meritless constitutional challenge or seek a duress instruction unsupported by the circumstances, and there were no errors to cumulate. Affirmed.