Other-acts evidence; MRE 404(b); MRE 403; Accosting a child for immoral purposes; MCL 750.145a; Alternative means of committing an offense; Specific unanimity instruction; People v Darga; People v Chelmicki; Sufficiency of the evidence

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other-acts evidence, a specific unanimity instruction was not required as to the alternative means of violating MCL 750.145a, and sufficient evidence supported defendant-Pinkowski's conviction of accosting a child for immoral purposes. Defendant, a 27-year-old health officer at a children’s camp, was convicted of accosting a child for immoral purposes and CSC II involving 14-year-old ES. The trial court admitted evidence of several other inappropriate comments and acts by defendant toward ES during the same summer. On appeal, the court determined that the evidence was offered for proper purposes under MRE 404(b), including defendant’s intent, motive, and common scheme. Defendant’s general denial placed his sexual intent at issue, and the uncharged conduct provided context for both the touching underlying the CSC II charge and his later question asking ES whether she came to the lodge “to have sex with me.” Further, the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because the conduct involved the same victim during the same general time and at the same location. Thus, “Pinkowski’s conduct and comments were highly probative of his intent to engage in sexual activity with ES.” The court next concluded that the jury did not have to unanimously agree whether defendant violated MCL 750.145a by accosting, enticing, or soliciting ES or by encouraging her. Those theories constitute alternative means of satisfying a single element rather than separate offenses, and there was only one charged act serving as the factual basis for the conviction. Finally, the evidence was sufficient where defendant twice asked ES whether she came to have sex with him shortly after trying to have her mimic sexual movements, and other evidence showed sexually motivated touching. A rational jury could find that defendant intended to accost, solicit, induce, or encourage ES to have sex with him. Affirmed.