Second-degree child abuse; Void for vagueness challenge to MCL 750.136b(3); People v Lawhorn; People v Gregg; Sufficiency of the evidence for a witness intimidation conviction; MCL 750.122; Unanimity jury instruction; People v Chelmicki; People v Cooks; Statute providing alternative means of committing an offense; People v Gadomski; Instructions on second-degree child abuse; Deviation from M Crim JI 17.20a & 17.20b; Ineffective assistance; Failure to raise a futile objection

The court held that the second-degree child-abuse statute (MCL 750.136b(3)) is not unconstitutionally vague, and that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s witness intimidation conviction. It also rejected his challenges to the jury instructions and his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. His 11-year-old son was the victim. The court noted that it “addressed and rejected the argument that the term ‘reasonable force’ is unconstitutionally vague under MCL 750.136b” in Gregg and Lawhorn. It held in Gregg “that the child-abuse statute was not unconstitutionally vague and clearly provides fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence of the conduct proscribed, namely, an act that causes serious physical or mental harm to a child or an act that is cruel to the child.” The court further found that defendant’s claim the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him failed “because his actions of pulling the child off the bed and repeatedly beating the child with a belt, causing severe bruising, clearly falls within the conduct prohibited under MCL 750.136b(3).” As to witness intimidation, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction under MCL 750.122 because [he] intimidated the child as an attempt to prevent him from speaking truthfully to the DHHS and police about defendant’s abuse.” Defendant’s jury instruction arguments also failed. The court determined that a specific unanimity instruction was not required where “the prosecution presented a single incident, and the jury was not required to make a unanimous decision on what theory the incident fell under.” Thus, the trial court did not err in only giving a general unanimity instruction. As to the second-degree child abuse instructions, it “was under no obligation to follow the model jury instructions verbatim” and it fully instructed the jury on the applicable law and theories of the offense “in an understandable manner that was not confusing or duplicative.” Finally, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections to the instructions. Affirmed.