Due process; Advice of appellate rights; MCR 3.965(B)(15) & 3.973(G)(2)-(4); Parenting time suspension; MCL 712A.13a(13); Notice of the termination trial & goal change to adoption; Reasonable reunification efforts; Accommodation of a parent’s intellectual disability & of mental-health conditions; Lack of substance-abuse services; Termination under § 19b(3)(j); Child’s best interests; In re White

The court held that (1) respondent-mother did not show plain error as to her due process violation claims, (2) the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts as to both parents, (3) § (j) was established as to respondent-father, and (4) terminating his rights was in the child’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order as to both parents. Among her due process claims, the mother asserted that “the trial court did not properly advise her of her appellate rights following” two hearings. The record showed that after a preliminary hearing on 8/21/24, it entered an order that authorized the DHHS’s petition, stated that the child was placed in the DHHS’s “care, and stated that the placement ‘shall continue pending [] resumption of the preliminary hearing.’ Included with that order was a notice that advised respondents of their right to appeal ‘any order removing [their] child[] from [their] care and custody.’” This document showed that, “in compliance with MCR 3.965(B)(15), the trial court advised [the] mother of her right to appeal following the removal of the child from her care. And nothing in MCR 3.965(B)(15) requires that such notice be given more than once following the child’s removal, even if the preliminary hearing proceeds over multiple dates.” The record also showed that, after the 12/24 hearing, “the trial court’s order of disposition was accompanied by a notice advising respondents of their right to appeal ‘an initial order of disposition following adjudication[,]’” and their other “appellate rights in compliance with MCR 3.973(G)(2)-(4).” The court further held that, given the extensive trial testimony about the accommodations made in the services provided to the mother, “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the steps” the DHHS took to facilitate reunification were reasonable. As to the father, without his “full participation in mental-health services and corresponding demonstrated benefit from” them, the DHHS “was limited in the services it could aid [him] with, even with accommodations.” And given his “insistence that he relied on marijuana to ensure the safety of those around him and his unwillingness to fully engage in other mental-health services, it” was not clear he would have “engaged in, let alone benefited from, substance-abuse services had” they been offered.