Termination at the initial disposition; MCL 712A.19a(2); Lack of a determination whether aggravated circumstances existed; In re Walters; Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); Whether the child was “found within the county”; MCR 3.926(A); Distinguishing In re Christie

The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that it had jurisdiction over respondents’ child (RPN), but it did err in “terminating their parental rights at the initial disposition without determining whether aggravated circumstances” existed. The court rejected respondent-father’s claim that the trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction because RPN “was not ‘found within the county’” as required by MCL 712A.2. While he contended this case was analogous to Christie, there were “several notable distinctions[.]” It was undisputed that both respondents resided in Alcona County, intended to return there after RPN’s birth, and they “had been the subjects of prior child protective proceedings commenced” there. Respondent-mother and RPN were temporarily in another county because the mother was unexpectedly admitted to a hospital there. And “the primary concerns underlying the petition were the unclean and unsafe conditions of the residence where respondents lived—namely,” their camper on property in Alcona County. But as to termination, the trial court “failed to make the requisite judicial determination relieving the agency of its obligation to provide reasonable efforts and authorizing termination at the initial disposition.” The court noted that an “aggravated circumstance—i.e., respondents’ prior terminations—existed that justified forgoing reasonable efforts and terminating respondents’ parental rights” here at the initial disposition. However, the trial court did not make any “reference to MCL 712A.19a(2), and the” DHHS also omitted any reference to the statute in its petition. The court noted that “it is the existence of aggravated circumstances and the requisite judicial determination based on those circumstances that may permit the agency to forgo reasonable efforts in an ensuing case—not the fact that reasonable efforts were made in a previous proceeding.” It vacated the termination order and remanded for the trial court to determine whether such circumstances relieved the DHHS of its duty to provide reasonable reunification efforts “under MCL 712A.19a(2). If not, it shall direct DHHS to prepare a case service plan to ensure that reasonable efforts” are made.