Motion for a new trial; Brady v Maryland; People v Chenault; Officer’s failure to activate his body-worn camera; Materiality requirement; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to challenge the validity of the traffic stop & to seek suppression of defendant’s statements made without Miranda warnings; Reasonable suspicion; People v Anderson; Navarette v California; “In custody”; Berkemer v McCarty

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial because he did not establish a Brady violation based on an officer’s (B) failure to activate his body-cam. The court also rejected his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of the traffic stop and to seek suppression of defendant’s statements made without Miranda warnings. He was convicted of OWI, third offense. The court first concluded he did not present evidence that B’s “body-worn camera would have captured information undermining confidence in the outcome of the trial, and thus” he failed to satisfy the materiality requirement for a Brady violation. In an affidavit attached to defendant’s motion, a witness stated that B appeared to turn his body-cam on or off, and she saw him screaming at defendant’s mother, H. But whether B yelled at H was “immaterial to the central issue of whether defendant was operating the crashed vehicle while intoxicated. Defendant’s unsupported assertion that the body camera would have yielded material evidence is speculative and insufficient to establish a Brady violation.” It added that his argument was essentially that B “failed to create certain evidence—namely, a complete video record of his actions that evening. The police are not constitutionally required to conduct specific tests during an investigation, nor are they required to generate particular types of evidence.” Further, assuming that he “intentionally deactivated his body camera, the record does not support the conclusion that he did so to conceal evidence with any discernible exculpatory value.” As to the ineffective assistance claims, the court concluded that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the tip from a witness at the scene “that the occupant of the crashed vehicle had recently left the area in a different vehicle” was reliable. And it “supported the traffic stop because it established reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have been afoot.” The court next found that “defendant was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda because he was subjected to an ordinary traffic stop that was not functionally equivalent to a formal arrest.” Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make futile motions. Affirmed.