Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; Custodial interrogation; Miranda v Arizona; Volunteered statements; Right to counsel; Waiver by stipulation; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to suppress; Futile motion; Trial strategy

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief based on the admission of his inculpatory statements because his statements to a police officer were volunteered, he waived review of his challenge to the detective-interview videos by stipulating to their admission, and he failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was convicted of felony murder and first-degree child abuse after his 14-month-old son died from a head injury. While defendant waited in a patrol vehicle after his arrest, he began talking about how he disciplined his son despite the officer telling him that he would not engage with him. Defendant later participated in two recorded detective interviews in which he admitted causing bruises on the child. On appeal, the court first rejected his challenge to the patrol-car statements. “Because defendant volunteered his statements to Officer [R], no Miranda violation occurred.” The officer “explicitly told defendant that he did not want to speak with him and that he would not be responding to anything he said,” and nothing indicated R was attempting to elicit information. As to the detective interviews, the court concluded that defendant waived appellate review when counsel stipulated to the videos’ admission. “Because defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the videos, this ‘waiver has extinguished any error.’” His ineffective-assistance claims also failed. A suppression motion as to the statements to R “would have been futile,” while admitting the detective videos constituted a reasonable strategy. “The videos displayed defendant’s account of his intentions without requiring him to testify.” Thus, counsel could challenge whether defendant knowingly or intentionally caused the fatal harm while avoiding cross-examination, and the remaining evidence was independently strong enough that defendant could not establish a reasonable probability of a different result. Affirmed.