Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA); Revocation of an affidavit of parentage (AOP); MCL 722.1445(2); “Nonconsensual sexual penetration”; Meaning of “nonconsensual”; Grooming & psychological manipulation; Clear & convincing evidence; Inapplicability of People v Hoffman; Evidentiary rulings; MRE 401, 402, 801(c) & 802

In this action to revoke an AOP, the court held that the trial court did not err on remand in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration under MCL 722.1445(2) or in excluding defendant’s proposed evidence. Defendant was plaintiff’s high-school teacher when their sexual relationship began. After she became pregnant, the parties executed the AOP. On remand from an earlier appeal, the trial court considered expert testimony concerning grooming and psychological manipulation and again revoked the AOP and terminated defendant’s parental rights. In this appeal, the court first addressed the statutory meaning of “nonconsensual.” Applying its plain meaning, it held that the term “means not agreed to willingly by all people involved.” It rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff had to prove conduct equivalent to a CSC offense, explaining that “[t]he plain language of MCL 722.1445(2) does not condition relief on whether the underlying conduct meets the elements to sustain a CSC charge.” Nor did the fact defendant had resigned as plaintiff’s teacher before the child was conceived compel a different result. The expert testified that grooming’s psychological effects do not necessarily end when a victim crosses an age threshold or a teacher resigns. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings, the court concluded that “[t]he record supports the trial court’s finding that defendant still had an influence on plaintiff after his resignation and he preyed on her vulnerability to lure her back and coerce her to submit to sexual penetration.” It also upheld the evidentiary rulings. “Each one of the proposed exhibits involved postconception conduct and thus were not relevant to the scope of the fact-finding hearing,” while several other proposed exhibits were hearsay and defendant identified no applicable exception. Affirmed.