Sufficiency of the evidence; Operating with a high blood alcohol content (BAC); MCL 257.625(1)(c); Statutory presumption; MCL 257.625a(6)(a); Circumstantial evidence; Consciousness of guilt; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to challenge prejudicial testimony; Prejudice

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction of operating with a high BAC and that he failed to establish ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to challenge a police officer’s testimony about a threatening remark defendant made after his arrest. His vehicle was found partially in a ditch against a stop sign. He smelled strongly of alcohol, swayed, slurred his speech, initially gave police a false name, denied drinking, and refused field-sobriety testing. His later blood test showed a BAC of 0.283. On appeal, the court concluded the prosecution sufficiently connected defendant’s intoxication to his operation of the vehicle. Under MCL 257.625a(6)(a), his BAC when tested “is presumed to be the same as at the time the person operated the vehicle.” In addition, “circumstantial evidence demonstrated that defendant operated the vehicle while impaired.” He admitted taking the vehicle for a test drive, was found in the driver’s seat, and told a passing motorist he intended to keep driving if the vehicle could be pulled back onto the roadway. His deception and refusal to cooperate also supported an inference of consciousness of guilt. Thus, “a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant operated his vehicle with a BAC of 0.17 or more.” As to ineffective assistance, the court did not decide whether counsel performed deficiently by failing to seek exclusion of defendant’s statement that a future encounter with police might end in “shots fired.” Instead, prejudice was dispositive. The properly admitted evidence “was independently sufficient for a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” while the “single, brief reference” to the threatening remark “added little to this already strong record.” Defendant therefore failed to show a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Affirmed.