Sentencing; Scoring of OV 19; MCL 777.49(c) (interference with the administration of justice); People v Hershey

Holding that the trial court did not err in scoring 10 points for OV 19, the court affirmed defendant’s 51 to 240-month sentences for his meth delivery convictions. It noted that his conduct twice prevented the trial “court from sentencing him on the scheduled date. First,” while he was ordered “at the plea hearing to schedule and attend a presentence interview, and defendant agreed to do so, he neither completed the presentence questionnaire nor met with the probation agent before the first scheduled sentencing hearing. Because the probation officer must complete a presentence investigation and report to the [trial] court before a defendant is sentenced for a felony,” sentencing could not take place on 9/23 and was adjourned to 11/12. Second, he did not appear on 11/12. “The trial court found that his absence was intentional, and the record supports that finding.” He was present when it adjourned sentencing to 11/12, “and according to the PSIR, when he was taken into custody after the hearing on [9/23], he told a correctional officer, ‘That’s the last time I’m showing up for court.’ Those facts support an inference that defendant’s failure to appear for the [11/12] hearing was intentional. [His] conduct, which delayed sentencing by nearly three months, went beyond a mere failure to facilitate the sentencing process; the record supports the inference that he was attempting to avoid being held accountable for the sentencing offenses, and his conduct hampered the trial court’s ability to impose its sentence.” As to his claim “he had a constitutional right not to speak with the probation agent,” the court concluded that whatever “the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination at a presentence interview may be, it does not entitle a defendant to disregard a court’s order to schedule and present himself or herself for a presentence interview.” As to his assertion that his 9/23 “statement merely expressed an intent to waive his right to be present at sentencing,” the court noted that a valid waiver of that right “does not permit a defendant to simply ignore future scheduled hearings.”