Whether the trial court should have conducted a preliminary hearing on an amended petition; MCR 3.961(C)(3); “Preliminary inquiry”; MCR 3.903(A)(23) & 3.962(B); Adjudication; Jury instructions; MCR 2.512(B)(2); Relevant date for jurisdiction purposes; Evidence; In re Dearmon; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Procedural due process; Allegations of prior Child Protective Service (CPS) involvement; Motion to strike; Inapplicability of MCR 2.115(B); Subject-matter jurisdiction; Sufficiency of the evidence as to two of the children

The court held that “respondent-mother was not entitled to a preliminary hearing on the amended petition under MCR 3.961(C)(3),” and that the jury was properly instructed that the date the original petition was filed was the relevant date for deciding jurisdiction. It also held that the trial court’s decision to use that date did not violate her procedural due-process rights. Her arguments related to allegations about her history with CPS and the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction likewise lacked merit. Finally, the court rejected her claim that jurisdiction was improperly found as to two of the children. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s orders of disposition and adjudication. She first challenged “the trial court’s decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry, rather than a preliminary hearing, on the amended petition.” The court concluded that “MCR 3.961(C) concerns the filing of amended or supplemental petitions to add another respondent parent as ‘an additional respondent’ and the proceedings that follow. MCR 3.961(C) was not triggered here, as DHHS simply amended the petition to change the relief it requested. A preliminary hearing on the amended petition under MCR 3.961(C)(3) was not required, and to reach the conclusion advocated by” respondent, the court would have “to read MCR 3.961(C)(3) in isolation, apart from (C)(1) and (2), which is improper.” Concerning the relevant date for jurisdiction, “DHHS did not alter the allegations in the amended petition. Instead, DHHS made an amended request for a temporary wardship to give respondent-mother the opportunity to participate in services and rectify the barriers to reunification, as opposed to termination” at the initial disposition. The fact that it did not alter the allegations against her precluded respondent’s “arguments because, when amending the petition, DHHS did not broaden the scope of what was relevant at the adjudication trial.” As to her assertion the trial court erred in failing to strike allegations about her prior CPS involvement, the court found “no indication that a motion to strike allegations in a DHHS petition is a recognized procedural tool available to a respondent-parent in a child-protective proceeding.”