Applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RLUA); MCL 324.73301(1); The “other outdoor recreational use” catchall provision; Neal v Wilkes; “Valuable consideration”; Syrowik v Detroit; “Pay”; Land covered by the RLUA; Admissibility of a defendant’s prior felony conviction; Negligent entrustment; Fredericks v General Motors Corp; Grand Trunk W RR Co v Pre-Fab Transit; Directed verdict; Gross negligence; Tarlea v Crabtree

The court held that the RLUA applied in this case arising from an accidental shooting, and that defendant-shooter’s (Andrew) prior felony conviction was properly excluded from evidence. But it concluded that the trial court erred in granting another defendant’s (Andrew’s father, John) motion for a directed verdict and dismissing the claims against defendant-Mann Farms (which were derivative of the claims against John). Plaintiff argued that the RLUA did not apply “because he was not engaging in any of the activities described.” But, based on the evidence, the court concluded there was no question of fact that plaintiff, Andrew, and another man “were engaging in activity within the scope of the RLUA by scouting for future hunting purposes and by hunting for small game. The fact that no small game was actually killed is not dispositive.” Further, the activity clearly fell “under the ‘other outdoor recreational use’ catchall provision. The act of scouting for future hunting purposes, while looking for small game, is sufficiently similar to the enumerated activity of ‘hunting’ to qualify as an ‘other outdoor recreational use.’” The court also rejected his claim that “he provided valuable consideration for his use of the land” because the evidence showed there were no crops “to protect. Consequently, there was no ‘benefit’ of quelling deer to protect crops at the time of the shooting incident.” As there was no dispute that he “never paid any money or gave a pecuniary measurable benefit for the privilege of hunting on the farm, he cannot escape the application of the RLUA.” And his argument that it “should not apply because it should only apply to ‘large tracts of undeveloped land’” failed under Neal. As to Andrew’s 12-year-old conviction, it “related to a much different category of ‘recklessness’ and had no bearing on whether John knew or had reason to know that Andrew would be reckless with the shotgun John let him use.” But the court reversed the directed verdict because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, allowed reasonable minds to “differ whether Andrew was intoxicated and whether John was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results by giving Andrew the shotgun.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.