e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 86687
Opinion Date : 10/20/2026
e-Journal Date : 11/03/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Rivet v. Wabeek Country Club, LLC
Practice Area(s) : Contracts Negligence & Intentional Tort
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Bazzi and Patel; Dissent – Ackerman
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Issues:

Contractual indemnification; Premises-liability claim; Contract interpretation; “Arising out of”; “Resulting from”; “Attributable in any way to”; Causal connection; But-for causation

Summary

The court held that an indemnity clause in the contract between defendant-country club (Wabeek) and third-party defendant-parish (Our Lady) did not require the parish to indemnify the club for plaintiff-Rivet’s premises-liability claim because her fall lacked the required causal connection to the parish’s event. Plaintiff attended a parish fundraiser at the club and allegedly slipped when a wet rug outside the women’s restroom slid across accumulated water. The club sought indemnification under language covering liabilities “arising out of or resulting from or attributable in any way to” the event. On appeal, the court concluded that all three phrases “plainly require a causal connection that is more substantial than mere coincidence or but-for causation.” As to “arising out of,” it reasoned that “the connection between Our Lady’s event and Rivet’s claims against Wabeek is simply incidental.” Plaintiff’s claims arose from an alleged hazardous condition involving accumulated water and the wet rug, and there was “no cause-and-effect relationship between Our Lady’s event and Rivet’s fall.” Likewise, her claims did not “result[] from” the event because “there is no evidence connecting the event to either the water accumulation or the placement of the rug on which Rivet fell.” The phrase “attributable in any way to” also required causation. The court explained that “‘the normal meaning of one thing to be attributed to another is that one thing is caused or brought about by that other thing.’” Although the indemnity language was broad, “such does not negate the requirement of a causal connection that is more substantial than mere coincidence between the underlying condition and the injury.” Construing the clause otherwise would effectively create a blanket assumption of liability for any injury occurring on the property during the event. Because the leaking-roof condition was unrelated to the fundraiser, the parish was entitled to summary disposition. Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion